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The Content-Discrimination
Principle and the Impact of
Reed v. Town of Gilbert
By David L. Hudson, Jr. †
Abstract
The content-discrimination principle remains the chief analytical
tool used in First Amendment jurisprudence. Under this doctrine, laws
are categorized as content-based or content-neutral. Content-based
laws are subject to strict scrutiny and content-neutral ones are subject
to intermediate scrutiny.
The U.S. Supreme Court ratcheted up the content-discrimination
principle in Reed v. Town of Gilbert. Previously, lower courts were
divided on whether a law was content-based if the underlying purpose
was not to engage in censorship or content-discrimination. In Reed,
however, the Court declared that the law’s purpose is not the central
inquiry. It concluded that if a law draws facial distinctions based on
speech then it is content-based.
This Article examines the Court’s decision in Reed and then
assesses how this doctrine intersects and interacts with two long–
standing and controversial doctrines in First Amendment law: (1) the
commercial-speech doctrine; and (2) the secondary-effects doctrine.
Under both of these doctrines, content-based laws involving commercial
speech or adult-oriented, sexual expression are treated as contentneutral. These doctrines are seemingly irreconcilable with Reed.
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Introducing the Content-Discrimination Principle
Perhaps the leading doctrinal concept in First Amendment freespeech jurisprudence is the content-discrimination principle.1 It has
been called “the central inquiry,”2 “a critically important aspect of First
Amendment doctrine,”3 “central to contemporary free speech law,”4
“fundamental to free speech doctrine,”5 a “keystone to [the] First
Amendment,”6 “the touchstone of First Amendment law,”7 “the most
pervasively employed doctrine in the jurisprudence of free expression,”8
and the “Supreme Court’s closest approach to articulating a unified
First Amendment doctrine.”9
Justice Thurgood Marshall, often underappreciated for his First
Amendment opinions,10 expressed the principle most eloquently when

1.

See Susan H. Williams, Content Discrimination and the First
Amendment, 139 U. Pa. L. Rev. 615, 616 (1991) (calling the principle
“one of the most important” in First Amendment law and a principle of
“growing prominence”); Genevieve Lakier, Reed v Town of Gilbert,
Arizona, and the Rise of the Anticlassificatory First Amendment, 2016
Sup. Ct. Rev. 233, 233 (describing the distinction between content-based
and content-neutral laws as “one of the most important” in First Amend–
ment law); Ashutosh Bhagwat, In Defense of Content Regulation, 102 Iowa
L. Rev. 1427, 1428 (2017) (describing the content-discrimination principle
as the “central tenet” of First Amendment free-speech jurisprudence).

2.

Erwin Chemerinsky, Content Neutrality as a Central Problem of Freedom
of Speech: Problems in the Supreme Court’s Application, 74 S. Cal. L.
Rev. 49, 49 (2000).

3.

Jay Alan Sekulow & Eric M. Zimmerman, Uncertainty Is the Only
Certainty: A Five-Category Test to Clarify the Unsure Boundaries
Between Content-Based and Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech, 65
Emory L.J. 455, 456 (2015).

4.

R. George Wright, Content-Based and Content-Neutral Regulation of Speech:
The Limitations of a Common Distinction, 60 U. Miami L. Rev. 333,
333 (2006).

5.

Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Clarifying the Content-Based/Content Neutral and
Content/Viewpoint Determinations, 34 McGeorge L. Rev. 595, 596 (2003).

6.

Elena Kagan, Private Speech, Public Purpose: The Role of Governmental
Motive in First Amendment Doctrine, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. 413, 443 (1996).

7.

Leslie Kendrick, Content Discrimination Revisited, 98 Va. L. Rev. 231,
232 (2012) (noting that for forty years the content-discrimination
principle has been a “touchstone” of First Amendment analysis).

8.

Geoffrey Stone, Content Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 Wm.
& Mary L. Rev. 189, 189 (1983).

9.

Daniel A. Farber, The First Amendment 21 (1st ed. 1998).

10.

See David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Marshall: Eloquent First Amendment
Defender, Freedom F. Inst. (Feb. 4, 2013), https://www.freedomforum
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he wrote in 1972: “[A]bove all else, the First Amendment means that
government has no power to restrict expression because of its message,
its ideas, its subject matter, or its content.”11 This statement was
historic, as it represented the first time that the Court emphatically
and explicitly emphasized the need for content neutrality.12
Under this now-familiar scheme, laws are considered content-based
or content-neutral. A content-based law treats speech or speakers
differently because of the message or content of the speech.13 A contentneutral law applies across the board and does not make such content
distinctions.14 The designation is mightily important, as content-based
laws are subject to strict scrutiny, while content-neutral laws are
subject to intermediate scrutiny.15 The distinction is often outcome
determinative in free-speech cases, as most content-based laws are
struck down and most content-neutral laws are upheld.16
The Court expanded the content-discrimination principle in a series
of cases after Police Department v. Mosley.17 In the early 1980s, leading
free-speech scholar Geoffrey Stone identified the principle as the Burger
Court’s “foremost contribution to free expression analysis.”18 The
institute.org/2013/02/04/justice-marshall-eloquent-first-amendmentdefender/ [https://perma.cc/N3UC-84LY]; David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice
Thurgood Marshall: Great Defender of First Amendment Free-Speech
Rights for the Powerless, 2 How. Hum. & C.R. L. Rev. 167, 168–69 (2018).
11.

Police Dep’t of Chi. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972).

12.

Williams, supra note 1, at 624 (“Despite some early indications of concern
about content discrimination, the classic statement of the requirement of
content neutrality did not appear until 1972. In Mosley, the Court clearly
announced the first amendment’s antipathy for content discrimination
and, less clearly, described what content discrimination meant.”) (footnotes
omitted); Steven Heyman, Spheres of Autonomy: Reforming the Content
Neutrality Doctrine in First Amendment Law, 10 Wm. & Mary Bill of
Rts. J. 647, 650 (2002) (“Although the case attracted little notice at the
time, Mosley’s doctrine of content neutrality has become the cornerstone
of the Supreme Court’s First Amendment jurisprudence.”) (footnote
omitted).

13.

Lakier, supra note 1, at 233.

14.

Id.

15.

See Enrique Armijo, Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Relax Everybody, 58 B.C.
L. Rev. 66, 92 (2017).

16.

See Barry P. McDonald, Speech and Distrust: Rethinking the Content
Approach to Protecting the Freedom of Expression, 81 Notre Dame L.
Rev. 1347, 1351–52 (2006).

17.

See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns of Cal. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115 (1989); R.A.V. v.
City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377 (1992).

18.

Stone, supra note 8, at 189.
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concern over content-discrimination is crucial, as the government may
be seeking to favor some forms of speech over others, engage in thought
control, or distort the marketplace of ideas.19 In 1992, the Court broad–
ened the content-discrimination principle’s scope by holding that the
government could not make impermissible content distinctions in areas
of expression traditionally not protected by the First Amendment, such
as fighting words.20 In 1994, Justice Sandra Day O’Connor may not
have given the content-discrimination principle a ringing endorsement,
but she noted that “no better alternative has yet come to light.”21
While the division between content-based and content-neutral
seems easy to understand, the Supreme Court acknowledged that it is
not always a simple task to apply the principle.22 Critics have charged
that the Court has been inconsistent and arbitrary in its application of
the content-discrimination principle.23 Others have criticized the Court
for relying too much on the doctrine.24 Division developed in the lower
courts over the application of the content-discrimination principle.
Some courts applied the doctrine quite broadly to cover most facial
distinctions on the basis of speech,25 while others focused more on the
underlying purpose of the regulation.26
The U.S. Supreme Court reiterated the importance of the contentdiscrimination principle in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, a case involving a
challenge to an Arizona ordinance that made many distinctions between
types of signs.27 The Court reasoned that a law can be content-based
even if the government does not have an explicit purpose to favor

19.

See City of Ladue v. Gilleo, 512 U.S. 43, 60 (1994) (O’Connor, J., concurring).

20.

R.A.V., 505 U.S. at 377.

21.

Gilleo, 512 U.S. at 60 (O’Connor, J., concurring).

22.

See Turner Broad. Sys. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 642 (1994).

23.

See Wright, supra note 4, at 335.

24.

See, e.g., Heyman, supra note 12, at 652 (“In my view, the time has come
to reconsider the content neutrality doctrine. . . . Content neutrality . . .
is an important element of free speech jurisprudence, but it should not be
regarded as ‘the first principle of the First Amendment.’”) (quoting Hill
v. Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 789 (2000) (Kennedy, J., dissenting)); John
Fee, Speech Discrimination, 85 B.U. L. Rev. 1103, 1106 (2005) (“To the
extent that the First Amendment requires government to treat equally
speech that it favors and disfavors, these circumstances are limited and
are for more modest reasons than the overarching goal of government
impartiality.”).

25.

Jacobs, supra note 5, at 605.

26.

Lakier, supra note 1, at 234.

27.

135 S. Ct. 2218, 2224 (2015).
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certain speech or disfavor certain ideas.28 Some view the Court’s
decision in Reed as a significant change, or as something that might
cause a “sea change” in the law.29 A recent federal district court decision
referred to it as a “watershed First Amendment case.”30 A leading legal
journalist called Reed the “sleeper” case of the Court’s term and one
that would have “far-reaching consequences.”31
This Article addresses the impact of Reed v. Town of Gilbert in the
lower courts. Part I provides an overview of the Court’s decision,
including its several concurrences that seek to limit or take issue with
the majority’s approach to content-discrimination. Part II addresses
and assesses the decision’s impact in several areas, including cases
involving political speech, the commercial-speech doctrine, and the
secondary-effects doctrine. Finally, Part III comments on the future of
the content-discrimination principle.

I.

Reed v. Town of Gilbert (2015)

The Supreme Court reaffirmed and expanded the importance of the
content-discrimination principle in Reed v. Town of Gilbert.32 The case
involved a challenge to an Arizona city’s sign ordinance that made
distinctions between various types of signs, including ideological, poli–
tical, and temporary directional signs.33 Ideological signs were treated
most favorably under the ordinance. They could be twenty feet in
diameter and could be placed in any city-zoned area.34 Political signs
could be sixteen feet wide on residential property and thirty-two feet
wide on nonresidential property.35 Political signs also had durational
limits; they could be placed only sixty days before an election and could
28.

Id. at 2227.

29.

See Anthony D. Lauriello, Note, Panhandling Regulation After Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, 116 Colum. L. Rev. 1105, 1106 (2016) (speaking of a
“coming sea change” caused by Reed); Kolby P. Marchand, Free Speech
and Signage After Reed v. Town of Gilbert: Signs of Change from the
Bayou State, 44 S.U. L. Rev. 181, 182 (2017) (calling Reed’s impact a
“significant change” to First Amendment law).

30.

Wash. Post v. McManus, 355 F. Supp. 3d 272, 296 (D. Md. 2019).

31.

Adam Liptak, Court’s Free Speech Expansion Has Far-Reaching
Consequences, N.Y. Times (Aug. 17, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/08/18/us/politics/courts-free-speech-expansion-has-far-reachingconsequences.html [https://perma.cc/45C5-FYSG].

32.

Reed, 135 S. Ct. at 2224.

33.

Id. at 2224–26.

34.

Id. at 2224.

35.

Id.
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stay up to fifteen days after.36 Meanwhile, temporary directional signs
were subject to many more restrictions. There could be no more than
four signs on a property, they could be placed only twelve hours before
a qualifying event, and they had to be taken down no later than one
hour after an event.37
Clyde Reed, pastor of the Good News Church, wanted to post signs
informing the public about church services, which were held at different
locations.38 Reed argued that twelve hours in advance was not enough
time to inform the public about each service (each church service was
a qualifying event for a temporary directional sign). He claimed that he
could not post the signs far enough in advance to be useful without
running afoul of the ordinance’s enforcers.39 Ultimately, he sued in
federal court.40 Both the federal district court and the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied injunctive relief and deemed the
town’s sign ordinance to be content-neutral.41 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the ordinance did not consider the content of the signs’
messages and that there was no purpose to discriminate against
speech.42
On appeal, the U.S. Supreme Court unanimously reversed that
judgment; but it was not unanimous in its reasoning.43 In his majority
opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas reasoned that laws are content-based
on their face if they either draw distinctions based on the speaker’s
message or define speech based on its function or purpose.44 He also
noted that laws are content-based if the government adopts the law
because of a disagreement with the speech’s message.45 He explained
that “an innocuous justification cannot transform a facially contentbased law into one that is content neutral.”46
Justice Thomas reasoned that the town’s sign ordinance was
content-based on its face because it drew distinctions based on the

36.

Id. at 2224–25.

37.

Id. at 2225.

38.

Id.

39.

Id. at 2225–26.

40.

Id. at 2226.

41.

Id.

42.

Id.

43.

The Court delivered three concurring opinions. See id. at 2223.

44.

Id. at 2227.

45.

Id.

46.

Id. at 2228.
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“communicative content of the sign.”47 He rejected the idea that the
sign ordinance was content-neutral because town leaders did not adopt
the ordinance based on disagreement with any message.48 According to
Justice Thomas, the Ninth Circuit erred by skipping over a “crucial
first step”: determining whether the ordinance was content-based on its
face.49 He explained that courts must first determine whether a law is
facially content-based or content-neutral before examining the justi–
fication or purpose behind the law.50 Thus, the first step of a Reed
analysis is facially examining a statute, regulation, ordinance, or policy
to determine if it is content-based.
Justices Samuel Alito, Stephen Breyer, and Elena Kagan authored
concurring opinions.51 Justice Alito explained that the Court’s decision
did not sound the death knell for all sign regulation.52 He specifically
listed a series of types of laws that would pass muster after the Court’s
decision, including ordinances regulating the size of signs, whether signs
are lighted or unlighted, signs with fixed messages and electronic
messages, and rules distinguishing between on-premise and off-premise
signs.53
Justice Breyer viewed current First Amendment jurisprudence as
too focused on labels and favored using content-discrimination as a
“rule of thumb” rather than what he called an “automatic ‘strict
scrutiny’ trigger.”54 He warned that applying strict scrutiny to laws that
draw content distinctions without any attempts at thought or idea
control could lead to unnecessary “judicial management of ordinary
government regulatory activity.”55
Justice Kagan’s concurrence criticized the majority’s approach the
most. She reasoned that courts apply strict scrutiny to content-based
laws for two fundamental reasons: to preserve a pure “marketplace of
ideas” that the government does not attempt to influence;56 and to
ensure that the government does not regulate speech because it harbors

47.

Id. at 2227.

48.

Id.

49.

Id. at 2228.

50.

Id.

51.

Id. at 2223.

52.

Id. at 2233–34 (Alito, J., concurring).

53.

Id. at 2233.

54.

Id. at 2234 (Breyer, J., concurring).

55.

Id.

56.

Id. at 2237 (Kagan, J., concurring) (quoting McCullen v. Coakley, 573
U.S. 464, 476 (2014)).
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“hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message.”57 She
explained: “We can administer our content-regulation doctrine with a
dose of common sense, so as to leave standing laws that in no way
implicate its intended function.”58 She warned that the majority’s
position might cause the Court to become “a veritable Supreme Board
of Sign Review.”59

II. Impact of the Reed Decision
A.

Political and Noncommercial Speech

Reed v. Town of Gilbert has had the most indelible impact in cases
that involve political speech and other forms of noncommercial speech.60
For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
determined that a state’s anti-robocall statute that applied to both
commercial and political messages was an impermissible content-based
restriction on speech.61 The law prohibited robocalls made “‘for the
purpose of making an unsolicited consumer telephone call’ or [that] are
‘of a political nature, including, but not limited to, calls relating to
political campaigns.’”62 The law permitted robocalls in three instances:
(1) when the recipient expressly agreed to receive them; (2) when the
calls were related to a pre-existing debt; or (3) when there was a preexisting business relationship.63
The Fourth Circuit applied the content-discrimination principle as
articulated in Reed and held that the law on its face made content
distinctions.64 After all, the law applied to consumer and political
messages but not others.65 Thus, the Fourth Circuit applied strict
scrutiny.66 The appeals court assumed that protecting residential
privacy was a compelling governmental interest but held that the law
was not narrowly tailored because there were several less speech57.

Id. (quoting R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 386 (1992)).

58.

Id. at 2238.

59.

Id. at 2239.

60.

See Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S., 825 F.3d 149 (3d Cir. 2016)
(discussing Reed’s effect on a First Amendment analysis); Norton v. City
of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411 (7th Cir. 2015) (same); Duguid v. Facebook,
Inc., 926 F.3d 1146 (9th Cir. 2019) (same).

61.

Cahaly v. LaRosa, 796 F.3d 399, 402 (4th Cir. 2015).

62.

Id. (quoting S.C. Code Ann. § 16-17-446(A) (2014)).

63.

Id.

64.

Id. at 405.

65.

Id.

66.

Id.
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restrictive alternatives, including “time-of-day limitations, mandatory
disclosure of the caller’s identity, or do-not-call lists.”67
The Reed decision likewise played a major role in a state high court
striking down its state cyberbullying statute as a content-based
regulation of speech.68 The law provided that “it shall be unlawful for
any person to use a computer or computer network to . . . [p]ost or
encourage others to post on the Internet private, personal, or sexual
information pertaining to a minor.”69
A lower court had determined that the law was content-neutral,
because it mainly prohibited conduct instead of speech.70 The appeals
court explained: “The Cyber-bullying Statute is not directed at
prohibiting the communication of thoughts or ideas via the Internet. It
prohibits the intentional and specific conduct of intimidating or
tormenting a minor. This conduct falls outside the purview of the First
Amendment.”71 Furthermore, the intermediate appellate court deter–
mined that any impact on speech was incidental rather than direct.72
The North Carolina Supreme Court reversed, determining that
the law was content-based.73 It primarily relied on Reed:
Recently . . . in Reed v. Town of Gilbert, [the U.S. Supreme]
Court clarified that several paths can lead to the conclusion that
a speech restriction is content based and therefore subject to strict
scrutiny. This determination can find support in the plain text of
a statute, or the animating impulse behind it, or the lack of any
plausible explanation besides distaste for the subject matter or
message.74

The North Carolina high court explained that the law was clearly
content-based because it defined and criminalized speech based on its
subject matter75: “The statute criminalizes some messages but not
others, and makes it impossible to determine whether the accused has
committed a crime without examining the content of his communi–

67.

Id.

68.

State v. Bishop, 787 S.E.2d 814, 818 (N.C. 2016).

69.

N.C. Gen. Stat. § 14-458.1(a)(1)(d) (2017).

70.

Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 816.

71.

State v. Bishop, 774 S.E.2d 337, 343 (N.C. App. 2015).

72.

Id. at 344.

73.

Bishop, 787 S.E.2d at 819.

74.

Id.

75.

Id.
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cation.”76 Because the law was content-based, the court applied strict
scrutiny.77 While the state had a compelling government interest in
protecting minors, the state high court determined that the law was
not narrowly tailored.78 The court was troubled by the fact that “the
statute contains no requirement that the subject of an online posting
suffer injury as a result, or even that he or she become aware of such a
posting.”79 The court concluded that while the state had a laudable
purpose, “North Carolina’s cyberbullying statute ‘create[s] a criminal
prohibition of alarming breadth.’”80
Reed also has had major influence in cases involving sign ordinances
that—like the ordinance at issue in Reed itself—impact political speech.
Take the example of Wagner v. City of Garfield Heights, a case
involving an Ohio city’s sign ordinance that imposed size limitations on
political yard signs.81 Under the ordinance, political signs were limited
to six square feet, but other signs, such as religious and commercial
signs, could be twice as large.82 The Sixth Circuit determined that the
law was clearly content-based under Reed and also unconstitutional.83
After all, political signs did not harm aesthetic appeal any more than a
variety of other signs.84
In another case, a federal district court in New York invalidated a
village’s ordinance that required a permit for noncommercial signs but
exempted many commercial signs from the permitting process.85 A
woman challenged the ordinance after she was cited for posting several
protest signs in her yard.86 The court noted that the law clearly was
content-based since it treated protest signs less favorably than other
signs.87
76.

Id.

77.

Id.

78.

Id. at 819–21.

79.

Id. at 820.

80.

Id. at 821 (quoting United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 474 (2010),
superseded by statute, Pub. L. No. 111-294, § 3(a), 124 Stat. 3178 (2010))
(alteration in original).

81.

675 F. App’x 599, 601 (6th Cir. 2017).

82.

Id.

83.

Id. at 607.

84.

Id.

85.

See Grieve v. Vill. of Perry, No. 15-CV-00365-RJA-JJM, 2016 WL 4491713,
at *3 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 3, 2016), adopted by No. 15-CV-365-A, 2016 WL
4478683 (W.D.N.Y. Aug. 25, 2016).

86.

Id. at *1.

87.

Id. at *3.
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Another federal district court in New York invalidated a town’s
ordinance that imposed severe restrictions on temporary signs, in–
cluding political signs, but allowed many types of commercial signs.88
The court reasoned that the law was content-based because it treated
signs differently based on their communicative content.89 Because the
law was content-based, the court applied strict scrutiny. The ordinance
failed strict scrutiny because the town’s interests in aesthetics and
traffic safety were substantial but not compelling.90
The Fourth Circuit ruled that Norfolk’s sign code violated the First
Amendment because it imposed size restrictions on many types of flags,
but allowed exemptions for certain flags with political or religious
content.91 The Fourth Circuit explained that, under Reed, the city’s
ordinance was clearly content-based because “[t]he former sign code
exempted governmental or religious flags and emblems, but applied to
private and secular flags and emblems.”92 The decision was striking
because before Reed the Fourth Circuit had reached the opposite
conclusion after deeming the sign code content-neutral.93 Legal
commentators warned that many cities and towns would need to amend
their sign codes after Reed.94 Certainly, many cities have amended their
sign codes in the wake of Reed, particularly those provisions that
impose differential treatment between commercial and noncommercial
speech.95
Another area in which Reed has had a transformative impact is
panhandling laws. In Reed’s aftermath, many panhandling ordinances
have been invalidated or at least temporarily halted.96 Even when a
panhandling ordinance is deemed content-neutral, it may not survive
88.

Marin v. Town of Southeast, 136 F. Supp. 3d 548, 552 (S.D.N.Y. 2015).

89.

Id. at 567–68.

90.

Id. at 568–69.

91.

Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 811 F.3d 625, 634 (4th Cir. 2016).

92.

Id. at 633.

93.

See Cent. Radio Co. v. City of Norfolk, 776 F.3d 229, 241 (4th Cir. 2015).

94.

Brian J. Connolly & Alan C. Weinstein, Sign Regulation After Reed:
Suggestions for Coping with Legal Uncertainty, 47 Urb. Law. 569, 610–
11 (2015).

95.

See Steve Butler, The Importance of Bringing Your Sign Code Up-toDate, Mun. Res. & Servs. Ctr. (Oct. 29, 2015), http://mrsc.org/Home/
Stay-Informed/MRSC-Insight/October-2015/The-Importance-of-Your-SignCode.aspx [https://perma.cc/2CP4-HVJM] (discussing Reed’s impact on
local governments’ sign codes).

96.

See, e.g., R.I. Homeless Advocacy Project v. City of Cranston, C.A. No.
17-334 S, 2017 WL 3327573, at *1 (D.R.I. Aug. 3, 2017) (enjoining an
ordinance that effectively made it “too difficult to panhandle successfully”).
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First Amendment review.97 One commentator writes that “the
constitutionality of current panhandling laws is dubious after Reed.”98
Perhaps the clearest example of Reed’s impact comes from litigation
over the city of Springfield, Illinois’s panhandling ordinance.99 Before
Reed, a divided three-judge panel of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Seventh Circuit upheld the panhandling ordinance as content-neutral.100
Writing for the panel, Judge Frank Easterbrook reasoned that laws are
content-based when they discriminate against speech based on ideas or
when the government passes the law to reflect disapproval of a certain
message.101 “It is hard to see an anti-panhandling ordinance as entailing
either kind of discrimination,” Easterbrook wrote.102 “‘Give me money
right now’ does not express an idea or message about politics, the arts,
or any other topic on which the government may seek to throttle
expression in order to protect itself or a favored set of speakers.”103
Judge Manion disagreed, finding the criminalization of panhandling
“alien to our First Amendment jurisprudence.”104 He reasoned that the
law clearly criminalized certain speech based on content, namely asking
for money.105 To enforce the ordinance, police officers have to ascertain
whether an individual asked for money, which was a violation, or merely
asked for time or labor, which was not a violation.106 Manion accused
the majority of confusing or conflating content-discrimination with
viewpoint discrimination: “In its attempt to determine whether the
ordinance is content-based, the court examines whether the ordinance
strips a viewpoint from the marketplace of ideas. That is not the test
for determining whether an ordinance is a content-based regulation of
speech.”107
The Seventh Circuit, however, had to re-address the ordinance’s
constitutionality after Reed. Judge Easterbrook recognized that Reed
had changed the game in that “Reed understands content-discrimin–
97.

Petrello v. City of Manchester, No. 16–cv–008–LM, 2017 WL 3972477, at
*10–11 (D. Mass. Sept. 7, 2017).

98.

Lauriello, supra note 29, at 1107.

99.

Norton v. City of Springfield, 768 F.3d 713, 714 (7th Cir. 2014).

100. Id. at 717–18.
101. Id. at 717.
102. Id.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 718 (Manion, J., dissenting).
105. Id. at 721.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 722.
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ation differently.”108 Easterbrook acknowledged that after Reed, “[a]ny
law distinguishing one kind of speech from another by reference to its
meaning now requires a compelling justification.”109 Thus, the Seventh
Circuit reached a different conclusion after Reed and held that the
ordinance was unconstitutional.110 Judge Manion once again concurred
separately, writing that “Reed injected some much-needed clarity into
First Amendment jurisprudence” by recognizing that “topical censor–
ship is still censorship.”111
A federal district court in Massachusetts invalidated the city of
Worchester’s ordinance dealing with “aggressive panhandling.”112 The
court easily found the law to be content-based under Reed.113 Still
another federal district court decision felled another panhandling ordin–
ance in Grand Junction, North Dakota.114
The consensus appears to be that many panhandling ordinances do
not survive a post-Reed analysis.115 As two legal commentators recently
explained in 2019, “[w]ithout a doubt, Reed has changed the playing
field for regulation of panhandling and solicitation, requiring that
henceforth such regulation be content-neutral in order to survive
judicial challenges.”116
B.

Commercial-Speech Cases

Reed’s impact diminishes in many cases that involve only
commercial speech or advertising, a category of speech defined as speech
that does no more than propose a commercial transaction117 or
“expression related solely to the economic interests of the speaker and
its audience.”118 The commercial-speech doctrine, which allows for
greater restriction of the content of commercial speech, as opposed to
108. Norton v. City of Springfield, 806 F.3d 411, 412 (7th Cir. 2015).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 412–13.
111. Id. at 413 (Manion, J., concurring).
112. Thayer v. City of Worcester, 144 F. Supp. 3d 218, 238 (D. Mass. 2015).
113. Id. at 233.
114. Browne v. City of Grand Junction, 136 F. Supp. 3d 1276, 1294 (D. Colo.
2015).
115. See Judith Welch Wegner & Matthew Norchi, Regulating Panhandling:
Reed and Beyond, 63 S.D. L. Rev. 579, 606–07 (2019).
116. Id. at 606.
117. See United States v. United Foods, Inc., 533 U.S. 405, 409–10 (2001).
118. City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 422 (1993)
(quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y.,
447 U.S. 557, 561 (1980)).
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noncommercial speech, appears to conflict squarely with Reed’s central
meaning.119
In 1942, the Supreme Court declared that commercial speech had
no First Amendment protection.120 The Court declared that “the
Constitution imposes no such restraint on government as respects
purely commercial advertising.”121 This rule stood for several decades
until the mid-1970s, when the Supreme Court overruled its 1942
decision and declared that “the free flow of commercial information is
indispensable” in a commercial culture.122 The Court explained that a
“consumer’s interest in the free flow of commercial information . . . may
be as keen, if not keener by far, than his interest in the day’s most
urgent political debate”123 and that “society also may have a strong
interest in the free flow of commercial information.”124 While the Court
explained that commercial speech was entitled to First Amendment
protection, it did not create a specific legal test to determine whether
laws impacting commercial speech were constitutional.125
In First Amendment jurisprudence, commercial speech receives
protection but it is still viewed as a stepchild in the First Amendment
family.126 All regulations of commercial speech—both content-based and
content-neutral—are evaluated under the so-called Central Hudson
test, a variant of intermediate scrutiny developed by the U.S. Supreme
Court in 1980.127
Thus, commercial speech is treated less favorably than
noncommercial speech. Content-based restrictions on noncommercial
speech are subject to strict scrutiny, while content-based restrictions on
119. See James Andrew Howard, Note, Salvaging Commercial Speech Doctrine:
Reconciling Reed v. Town of Gilbert with Constitutional Free Speech
Tradition, 27 Geo. Mason U. C.R.L.J. 239, 243–44 (2017) (“If Reed is
to be taken on its face, then any separate distinctions for commercial
speech must be implicitly overturned.”); Amanda Shanor, The New Lochner,
2016 Wis. L. Rev. 133, 180 (noting that Reed “signals growing tension
between various First Amendment sub-doctrines”).
120. Valentine v. Chrestensen, 316 U.S. 52, 54 (1942).
121. Id.
122. Va. State Bd. of Pharmacy v. Va. Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S.
748, 765 (1976).
123. Id. at 763.
124. Id. at 764.
125. David L. Hudson, Jr., The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech
§ 6.5, at 155 (1st ed. 2012).
126. Rodney A. Smolla, The Puffery of Lawyers, 36 U. Rich. L. Rev. 1, 4 (2002).
127. See Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm’n of N.Y., 447
U.S. 557, 566 (1980).

272

Case Western Reserve Law Review·Volume 70·Issue 2·2019
The Content-Discrimination Principle and the Impact of Reed v. Town of
Gilbert

commercial speech nearly always are evaluated under Central Hudson’s
form of intermediate scrutiny.128
The commercial-speech doctrine does not make much sense in a
world dominated by advertising and consumer choice. In 1990, Judge
Alex Kozinski and legal scholar Stuart Banner penned an incisive
article, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech, in which they conclude
that the commercial speech versus noncommercial speech distinction
“makes no sense.”129
And yet the Central Hudson test and its variant of intermediate
scrutiny have proven surprisingly durable.130 Under Central Hudson, a
government restriction on advertisements or other commercial speech
is permissible only on a showing that: (1) the advertising is misleading,
(2) the government interest in regulation is substantial, (3) the
regulation directly advances that interest, and (4) the regulation is not
more extensive than necessary.131 Justice Lewis Powell justified this
lower level of protection for free speech because of the inherent
“hardiness” of commercial speech.132 Another reason that supposedly
justifies less free-speech protection for commercial speech is that
advertising is more objectively verifiable.133
But the notion that it is easier to determine or verify the truth of
commercial speech is doubtful at best.134 Furthermore, the idea that
commercial speech is more “durable” than other forms of speech—
because there are profit motivations behind it—is even shakier than the
other justification. Kozinski and Banner explain that “the durability of
speech is not purely a function of the economic interest behind it; other
interests can be just as strong as economics, sometimes stronger.”135
These scholars are far from alone.136 First Amendment expert Rodney
128. See Hudson, Jr., supra note 125, § 6.1, at 140 (“For example, recall that
a content-based restriction on political speech is subject to the highest
form of judicial review, called strict scrutiny. However, content-based
restrictions on commercial speech are subject to only intermediate
scrutiny.”).
129. Alex Kozinski & Stuart Banner, Who’s Afraid of Commercial Speech?,
76 Va. L. Rev. 627, 627–28 (1990).
130. Hudson, Jr., supra note 125, § 6.5, at 156.
131. Central Hudson, 447 U.S. at 566.
132. Id. at 564 n.6.
133. See Kozinski & Banner, supra note 129, at 634.
134. Id. at 635.
135. Id. at 637.
136. See Rodney A. Smolla, Information, Imagery, and the First Amendment:
A Case for Expansive Protection of Commercial Speech, 71 Tex. L. Rev.
777, 780 (1993).
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Smolla declared that “[c]ommercial speech, as speech, should presump–
tively enter the debate with full First Amendment protection.”137
Commercial speech, however, remains a second-class citizen in the
First Amendment family. Justice Clarence Thomas has criticized the
Central Hudson test as providing too little protection for commercial
speech.138 He believes that bans on truthful, non-misleading speech
should be evaluated under strict scrutiny just like bans on political
speech.139 Recall that Justice Thomas also authored the Court’s opinion
in Reed. Some have speculated that this means that the second-class
treatment of commercial speech might be nearing its end.140
To date, many courts continue to apply the Central Hudson test to
regulations on commercial speech even after mentioning Reed.141 For
example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld a city’s
mobile billboard ordinance,142 which prohibited “mobile billboard ad–
vertising displays” (namely, billboards on moving vehicles).143 The
ordinance prohibited only signs that advertise; accordingly, mobile
billboard companies asserted that this made the ordinance contentbased.144 The Ninth Circuit, however, applied a broader meaning to the
term “advertising signs,” taking it to mean any sign on a mobile
billboard: “[M]obile billboard bans regulate the manner—not the
content—of affected speech. The ordinances address only the types of
sign-bearing vehicles subject to regulation, and discriminate against
prohibited billboards on the basis of their size and mobility alone, and

137. Id.
138. 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S. 484, 521–22 (1996) (“I do
not see a philosophical or historical basis for asserting that ‘commercial
speech’ is of ‘lower value’ than ‘noncommercial’ speech.”); see also David
L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Clarence Thomas: The Emergence of a
Commercial Speech Protector, 35 Creighton L. Rev. 485, 497 (2002).
139. Hudson, Jr., supra note 138, at 499.
140. See Vugo, Inc. v. City of New York, 309 F. Supp. 3d 139, 148 (S.D.N.Y.
2018) (noting that some have wondered about the fate of the commercialspeech doctrine in light of Justice Thomas’s call for abandoning Central
Hudson’s test and his authoring the Court’s opinion in Reed).
141. Id. (“[T]he Court thus declines to stray from such well-established
doctrine absent an express holding from either the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit”); Contest Promotions, LLC v.
City of San Francisco, 704 F. App’x 665, 667–68, 667 n.1 (9th Cir. 2017)
(noting that Reed does not alter the commercial-speech doctrine).
142. Lone Star Sec. & Video Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 827 F.3d 1192, 1202
(9th Cir. 2016).
143. Id. at 1196.
144. Id. at 1198–99.
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are thus content neutral.”145 The Ninth Circuit specifically addressed
and distinguished the mobile billboard ordinance from the ordinance
invalidated in Reed.146
Similarly, a federal district court in New Hampshire determined
that a town’s denial of a permit to a church to post an electronic sign
did not violate the First Amendment.147 The court reasoned that the
town’s regulation of electronic signs was a permissible, content-neutral
provision.148 The town asserted that the ban on electronic signs served
its substantial interests in aesthetics and traffic safety.149 The judge
wrote that electronic signs could be “garish” and could threaten the
aesthetics of the small town.150 With regard to traffic safety, the judge
simply deferred to town officials and wrote that he was not in a position
to “second guess” them.151
Not all courts ignore Reed when an ordinance involves only
commercial speech. A federal district court in New Jersey struck down
an Atlantic City ordinance prohibiting businesses from engaging in
bring-your-own-beer-and-wine advertising.152 While the ordinance
limited commercial speech, the court cited Reed and subjected the
ordinance to strict scrutiny instead of the familiar Central Hudson
test.153 The court wrote that the ordinance “provides a complete ban on
truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech about a lawful product.”154
The court also held that, even if the Central Hudson test applies, the
advertising ban fails intermediate scrutiny, too.155
Many commentators have noted that Reed involved a specific
challenge to a sign ordinance that involved differential treatment of
commercial and noncommercial speakers.156 They point out that Reed
145. Id. at 1200.
146. Id.
147. Signs for Jesus v. Town of Pembroke, 230 F. Supp. 3d. 49, 68–69 (D.N.H.
2017).
148. Id. at 63.
149. Id. at 60–61.
150. Id. at 61.
151. Id.
152. GJJM Enters. v. City of Atlantic City, 352 F. Supp. 3d 402, 408 (D.N.J.
2018).
153. Id. at 406.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 407.
156. Note, Free Speech Doctrine After Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 129 Harv.
L. Rev. 1981, 1981–82, 1987, 1991 (2016).
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did not involve commercial speech.157 It is quite difficult, however, to
square the commercial-speech doctrine with numerous statements in
Reed, including the Court’s take on content-based laws: “Content-based
laws—those that target speech based on its communicative content—
are presumptively unconstitutional and may be justified only if the
government proves that they are narrowly tailored to serve compelling
state interests.”158 This is also true with respect to Reed’s position that
the “[g]overnment[’s] regulation of speech is content based if a law
applies to particular speech because of the topic discussed or the idea
or message expressed.”159
C.

The Secondary-Effects Doctrine

Reed v. Town of Gilbert’s emphasis on content-discrimination also
appears to call into question the continued validity of the secondaryeffects doctrine, a disturbing legal fiction of sorts which allows for
content-based restrictions on businesses conveying “adult” expression
to be classified as content-neutral.160
Under the secondary-effects doctrine, certain speech can be
censored not because of its content’s “offensiveness” but because of
some adverse side effect—a secondary effect—such as increased crime
or decreased property values.161 The doctrine provides an easy path for
government officials to censor expression because government officials
can often come up with alleged secondary effects caused by speech.162
One leading free-speech scholar has called the doctrine both
“misleading” and “dangerous.”163
In a dissenting opinion in an adult-business zoning case, Justice
Potter Stewart warned that the secondary-effects doctrine “rides
roughshod over cardinal principles of First Amendment law.”164 Despite

157. Id. at 1990–91.
158. Reed v. Town of Gilbert, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 2226 (2015).
159. Id. at 2227.
160. See David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: ‘The
Evisceration of First Amendment Freedoms’, 37 Washburn L.J. 55, 60,
73 (1997).
161. See id. at 62.
162. David L. Hudson, Jr., The Secondary Effects Doctrine: Stripping Away
First Amendment Freedoms, 23 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 19, 19–20 (2012).
163. John Fee, The Pornographic Secondary Effects Doctrine, 60 Ala. L. Rev.
291, 293 (2005).
164. Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 85–86 (1976) (Stewart,
J., dissenting).
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that warning, the doctrine has become the dominant analytical model
used to justify myriad restrictions on adult businesses.165
The U.S. Supreme Court developed the secondary-effects doctrine
in a footnote166 to a 1976 case in which it upheld a Detroit Anti-Skid
Row ordinance that imposed locational zoning requirements on adult
businesses.167 The Court also emphasized that the case concerned a form
of low-value speech:
[E]ven though we recognize that the First Amendment will not
tolerate the total suppression of erotic materials that have some
arguably artistic value, it is manifest that society’s interest in
protecting this type of expression is of a wholly different, and
lesser, magnitude than the interest in untrammeled political
debate that inspired Voltaire’s immortal comment.168

Ten years later, in Renton v. Playtime Theatres,169 the Court
expanded the secondary-effects doctrine from a footnote into a major
doctrinal principle.170 The Court upheld a Renton, Washington,
ordinance that prohibited adult movie theaters from locating within one
thousand feet of any residential area, church, park, or school.171 The
Court reasoned that the ordinance was content-neutral because it was
not designed to suppress offensive speech, but rather to combat harmful
secondary effects associated with the expression.172

165. See Hudson, Jr., supra note 162, at 19.
166. See Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34; see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Famous
Footnotes Step Up in Important First Amendment Cases, Freedom F.
Inst. (Apr. 13, 2015), https://www.freedomforuminstitute.org/2015/
04/13/famous-footnotes-step-up-in-important-first-amendment-cases
[https://perma.cc/9UZ5-LCJK].
167. Young, 427 U.S. at 71 n.34 (plurality opinion) (“The Common Council’s
determination was that a concentration of ‘adult’ movie theaters causes
the area to deteriorate and become a focus of crime, effects which are not
attributable to theaters showing other types of films. It is this secondary
effect which these zoning ordinances attempt to avoid, not the dissemination
of ‘offensive’ speech.”).
168. Id. at 70; see also Evelyn Beatrice Hall, The Friends of Voltaire
199 (1907) (the Voltaire comment referenced by the Court is: “I disapprove
of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it.”).
169. 475 U.S. 41 (1986).
170. See id. at 49–52.
171. Id. at 43.
172. Id. at 47.
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The Court later applied the secondary-effects doctrine in cases that
involved regulating the form of nude performance dancing.173 Ironically,
in the later of those two decisions, Justice John Paul Stevens—who
wrote the Court’s initial secondary-effects decision in Young—
dissented, recognizing the impact of the Court expanding the doctrine
beyond restrictions on adult businesses’ locations to direct restrictions
on their expression.174 In another decision, the Court extended the
secondary-effects doctrine to ban so-called multiple-use adult businesses
even though they were under the same roof.175
Some courts recognize the tension between the secondary-effects
doctrine and Reed. For example, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
Eleventh Circuit put it bluntly: “There is no question that Reed has
called into question the reasoning undergirding the secondary-effects
doctrine.”176 The Eleventh Circuit noted, however, that the Supreme
Court in Reed never mentioned the term “secondary effects” and, thus,
the intermediate appellate court could not “read Reed as abrogating
either the Supreme Court’s or this Circuit’s secondary-effects
precedents.”177
Several courts have cursorily dismissed the impact of Reed in adultbusiness secondary effects cases. The Seventh Circuit briefly addressed
the tension between Reed and the secondary-effects doctrine in a
footnote in an adult business case.178 The appeals court questioned
whether Reed should impact the law on sexually oriented businesses:
“We don’t think Reed upends established doctrine for evaluating
regulation of businesses that offer sexually explicit entertainment, a
category the Court has said occupies the outer fringes of First

173. City of Erie v. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. 277 (2000); Barnes v. Glen Theatre,
Inc., 501 U.S. 560 (1991).
174. Pap’s A.M., 529 U.S. at 317–18 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“Until now, the
‘secondary effects’ of commercial enterprises featuring indecent entertainment
have justified only the regulation of their location. For the first time, the
Court has now held that such effects may justify the total suppression of
protected speech.”); see also David L. Hudson, Jr., Justice Stevens,
Justice Souter, and the Secondary Effects Doctrine, 35 UWLA L. Rev.
48, 49 (2003) (explaining that both Justices John Paul Stevens and David
Souter initially supported the secondary-effects doctrine but later dissented
in secondary-effects cases).
175. City of Los Angeles v. Alameda Books, Inc., 535 U.S. 425, 429–30 (2002).
176. Flanigan’s Enters. of Ga. v. City of Sandy Springs, 703 F. App’x 929, 935
(11th Cir. 2017).
177. Id.
178. See BBL, Inc. v. City of Angola, 809 F.3d 317, 326 n.1 (2015).
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Amendment protection.”179 The Supreme Court of Georgia reached a
similar conclusion—ironically, also in a footnote.180
There is another trend developing in some courts’ recent decisions
involving First Amendment challenges to adult entertainment reg–
ulations. These decisions note the tension between Reed and the
secondary-effects doctrine, but still apply the doctrine.181 As one federal
district court judge recently wrote, “Young and Renton remain good
law. It is not for me to repudiate these decisions by ruling that the
regulation of adult-oriented businesses amounts to content-based
regulation and warrants the application of strict scrutiny.”182
Reed had a significant impact on the Third Circuit’s examination
of 18 U.S.C. § 2257,183 the Department of Justice’s recordkeeping
provision that requires producers of sexually oriented materials to keep
records to ensure that minors are not used in the production of the
material.184 The law “requires producers of visual depictions of ‘actual
sexually explicit conduct’ to keep ‘individually identifiable records’
documenting the identity and age of every performer appearing in those
depictions.”185 There are also detailed regulations accompanying the law
that impose further recordkeeping requirements on producers of
sexually explicit material.186

179. Id.
180. Maxim Cabaret, Inc. v. Town of Sandy Springs, 816 S.E.2d 31, 36 n.4
(Ga. 2018) (“But Reed did not involve secondary-effects legislation. Nor
did the opinion in Reed mention, much less overrule, prior cases in which
the Supreme Court specifically held that regulations designed to reduce
the negative secondary effects of adult entertainment businesses are
treated as content neutral and thus subject to an intermediate level of
scrutiny.”).
181. See, e.g., “Q”-Lungian Enters. v. Town of Windsor Locks, 272 F. Supp.
3d 289, 296 (D. Conn. 2017) (applying the secondary-effects doctrine
despite acknowledging tension created by Reed); 1407, LLC v. City of
Fort Wayne, No. 1:18-CV-224-TLS, 2019 WL 341239, at *4 (N.D. Ind.
Jan. 25, 2019) (same).
182. “Q”-Lungian Enters., 272 F. Supp. 3d at 296.
183. See Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S. (FSC III), 825 F.3d 149, 158
(3d Cir. 2016) (holding § 2257 unconstitutional in light of Reed).
184. See 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2012).
185. FSC III, 825 F.3d at 154 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2257 (2012)).
186. Id. at 155. See generally 28 C.F.R. § 75.2 (2019) (detailing the Department
of Justice’s recordkeeping requirements for producers of sexually explicit
material).
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The Free Speech Coalition and others challenged the law on First
Amendment grounds.187 A key aspect of the litigation concerned whe–
ther 18 U.S.C. § 2257 and its accompanying regulations were contentneutral or content-based.188 The Third Circuit initially determined that
the laws were content-neutral.189 The case returned to the Third Circuit
a second time and the appeals court affirmed the law’s constitutionality
under intermediate scrutiny.190
The law’s third time before the Third Circuit was the charm, as the
Supreme Court had decided Reed in the meantime.191 This time, the
Third Circuit reasoned that the law was clearly content-based, because
it applied only to expressive material that contained sexually explicit
content.192 The government argued that the secondary-effects doctrine
should apply and, thus, intermediate scrutiny should apply.193 The
Third Circuit rejected the government’s proposed expansion of the
secondary-effects doctrine beyond brick-and-mortar adult entertain–
ment zoning cases.194 Interestingly, the Third Circuit questioned whe–
ther the secondary-effects doctrine should survive Reed.195
So far, most courts have allowed the secondary-effects doctrine and
Reed to co-exist.196 This has led some commentators to predict that the
troubled doctrine likely will continue its unsteady stay in First
Amendment jurisprudence.197

187. Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S. (FSC I), 677 F.3d 519, 528 (3d Cir.
2012).
188. Id. at 533.
189. Id.
190. Free Speech Coal. v. Att’y Gen. U.S. (FSC II), 787 F.3d 142, 146–47 (3d
Cir. 2015).
191. See FSC III, 825 F.3d at 153.
192. Id. at 160.
193. Id.
194. Id. at 161–63.
195. See id. at 161.
196. See, e.g., Mass. Ass’n of Private Career Schs. v. Healey, 159 F. Supp. 3d
173, 191–93 (D. Mass. 2016); CTIA–The Wireless Ass’n v. City of
Berkeley, 139 F. Supp. 3d 1048, 1061 (N.D. Cal. 2015) (“The Supreme
Court has clearly made a distinction between commercial speech and
noncommercial speech and nothing in its recent decisions, including Reed,
even comes close to suggesting that that well-established distinction is no
longer valid.”).
197. Jacobs, supra note 5, at 635.
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Conclusion
Reed v. Town of Gilbert was a significant free-speech decision. It
emphasized the importance of the content-discrimination principle by
focusing first on the statute’s facial language before inquiring into its
purpose. Reed’s impact has been noticeable in many cases involving
noncommercial speech, particularly those dealing with panhandling
political speech.
Reed’s impact has been minimized, however, as courts have
continued to follow two longstanding doctrines in First Amendment
law: the commercial-speech and the secondary-effects doctrine.198 This
is disturbing because both doctrines are aberrations from pure First
Amendment principles. Both doctrines warrant abject content-disc–
rimination, preventing speech from entering the marketplace of ideas.
Hopefully, in the near future the Court will re-examine both doctrines
to determine whether they comply with fundamental First Amendment
principles and the content-discrimination principle of Reed.

198. Kyle Langvardt, A Model of First Amendment Decision-Making at a
Divided Court, 84 Tenn. L. Rev. 833, 851 (2017) (“Reed’s hard line is
almost certainly too extreme to hold, and there is evidence even now that
the lower courts are already at pains to minimize its practical effects.”).
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